Filters::getEmojis() - Code Metrics - Inspection of "Merge pull request #13 from alxarafe/REFACTOR_MAIN..." - alxarafe/alixar - Measure and Improve Code Quality continuously with Scrutinizer

Test Setup Failed

Push — dev ( 608138...99eb65 )

by Rafael

created 2024-10-23 07:35 UTC

Filters::getEmojis() A

↳ Parent: Filters

Complexity

Conditions	1
Paths	1

Size

Total Lines	15
Code Lines	11

Duplication

Lines	0
Ratio	0 %

Importance

Changes	1
Bugs	0	Features	0

Metric	Value
cc	1
eloc	11
nc	1
nop	0
dl	0
loc	15
rs	9.9
c	1
b	0
f	0

<?php

/* Copyright (C) 2024       Rafael San José             <[email protected]>
 *
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
 * (at your option) any later version.
 *
 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
 * GNU General Public License for more details.
 *
 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
 * along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
 */

namespace Dolibarr\Lib;

use Exception;

abstract class Filters
{
    /**
     * Remove EMoji from email content
     *
     * @param string $text String to sanitize
     * @param int $allowedemoji Mode to allow emoji
     * @return  string                  Sanitized string
     */
    public static function removeEmoji($text, $allowedemoji = 1)
    {
        // $allowedemoji can be
        // 0=no emoji, 1=exclude the main known emojis (default), 2=keep only the main known (not implemented), 3=accept all
        // Note that to accept emoji in database, you must use utf8mb4, utf8mb3 is not enough.

        if ($allowedemoji == 0) {
            // For a large removal:
            $text = preg_replace('/[\x{2600}-\x{FFFF}]/u', '', $text);
            $text = preg_replace('/[\x{10000}-\x{10FFFF}]/u', '', $text);
        }

        // Delete emoji chars with a regex
        // See https://www.unicode.org/emoji/charts/full-emoji-list.html
        if ($allowedemoji == 1) {
            $arrayofcommonemoji = static::getEmojis();

            foreach ($arrayofcommonemoji as $key => $valarray) {
                $text = preg_replace('/[\x{' . $valarray[0] . '}-\x{' . $valarray[1] . '}]/u', '', $text);
            }
        }

        if ($allowedemoji == 2) {
            // TODO Not yet implemented
        }

        return $text;
    }

    /**
     * Return array of Emojis for miscellaneous use.
     *
     * @return  array<string,array<string>>         Array of Emojis in hexadecimal
     */
    private static function getEmojis()
    {
        $arrayofcommonemoji = array(
            'misc' => array('2600', '26FF'),        // Miscellaneous Symbols
            'ding' => array('2700', '27BF'),        // Dingbats
            '????' => array('9989', '9989'),        // Variation Selectors
            'vars' => array('FE00', 'FE0F'),        // Variation Selectors
            'pict' => array('1F300', '1F5FF'),      // Miscellaneous Symbols and Pictographs
            'emot' => array('1F600', '1F64F'),      // Emoticons
            'tran' => array('1F680', '1F6FF'),      // Transport and Map Symbols
            'flag' => array('1F1E0', '1F1FF'),      // Flags (note: may be 1F1E6 instead of 1F1E0)
            'supp' => array('1F900', '1F9FF'),      // Supplemental Symbols and Pictographs
        );

        return $arrayofcommonemoji;
    }

    /**
     * Return true if security check on parameters are OK, false otherwise.
     *
     * @param string|array<string,string> $var Variable name
     * @param int<0,2> $type 1=GET, 0=POST, 2=PHP_SELF
     * @param int<0,1> $stopcode 0=No stop code, 1=Stop code (default) if injection found
     * @return      boolean                     True if there is no injection.
     */
    public static function analyseVarsForSqlAndScriptsInjection(&$var, $type, $stopcode = 1)
    {
        if (!is_array($var)) {
            return (static::testSqlAndScriptInject($var, $type) <= 0);
        }

        foreach ($var as $key => $value) {  // Warning, $key may also be used for attacks
            // Exclude check for some variable keys
            if ($type === 0 && defined('NOSCANPOSTFORINJECTION') && is_array(constant('NOSCANPOSTFORINJECTION')) && in_array($key, constant('NOSCANPOSTFORINJECTION'))) {
                continue;
            }

            if (static::analyseVarsForSqlAndScriptsInjection($key, $type, $stopcode) && static::analyseVarsForSqlAndScriptsInjection($value, $type, $stopcode)) {
                //$var[$key] = $value;  // This is useless
            } else {
                http_response_code(403);

                // Get remote IP: PS: We do not use getRemoteIP(), function is not yet loaded and we need a value that can't be spoofed
                $ip = (empty($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']) ? 'unknown' : $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']);

                if ($stopcode) {
                    $errormessage = 'Access refused to ' . htmlentities($ip, ENT_COMPAT, 'UTF-8') . ' by SQL or Script injection protection in main.inc.php:analyseVarsForSqlAndScriptsInjection type=' . htmlentities((string)$type, ENT_COMPAT, 'UTF-8');
                    //$errormessage .= ' paramkey='.htmlentities($key, ENT_COMPAT, 'UTF-8');    // Disabled to avoid text injection

                    $errormessage2 = 'page=' . htmlentities((empty($_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"]) ? '' : $_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"]), ENT_COMPAT, 'UTF-8');
                    $errormessage2 .= ' paramtype=' . htmlentities((string)$type, ENT_COMPAT, 'UTF-8');
                    $errormessage2 .= ' paramkey=' . htmlentities($key, ENT_COMPAT, 'UTF-8');
                    $errormessage2 .= ' paramvalue=' . htmlentities($value, ENT_COMPAT, 'UTF-8');

                    print $errormessage;
                    print "<br>\n";
                    print 'Try to go back, fix data of your form and resubmit it. You can contact also your technical support.';

                    print "\n" . '<!--' . "\n";
                    print $errormessage2;
                    print "\n" . '-->';

                    // Add entry into the PHP server error log
                    if (function_exists('error_log')) {
                        error_log($errormessage . ' ' . substr($errormessage2, 2000));
                    }

                    // Note: No addition into security audit table is done because we don't want to execute code in such a case.
                    // Detection of too many such requests can be done with a fail2ban rule on 403 error code or into the PHP server error log.


                    if (class_exists('PHPUnit\Framework\TestSuite')) {
                        $message = $errormessage . ' ' . substr($errormessage2, 2000);
                        throw new Exception("Security injection exception: $message");
                    }
                    exit;

                } else {
                    return false;
                }
            }
        }
        return true;
    }

    /**
     * Security: WAF layer for SQL Injection and XSS Injection (scripts) protection (Filters on GET, POST, PHP_SELF).
     * Warning: Such a protection can't be enough. It is not reliable as it will always be possible to bypass this. Good protection can
     * only be guaranteed by escaping data during output.
     *
     * @param string $val Brute value found into $_GET, $_POST or PHP_SELF
     * @param string $type 0=POST, 1=GET, 2=PHP_SELF, 3=GET without sql reserved keywords (the less tolerant test)
     * @return      int                     >0 if there is an injection, 0 if none
     */
    public static function testSqlAndScriptInject($val, $type)
    {
        // Decode string first because a lot of things are obfuscated by encoding or multiple encoding.
        // So <svg o&#110;load='console.log(&quot;123&quot;)' become <svg onload='console.log(&quot;123&quot;)'
        // So "&colon;&apos;" become ":'" (due to ENT_HTML5)
        // So "&Tab;&NewLine;" become ""
        // So "&lpar;&rpar;" become "()"

        // Loop to decode until no more things to decode.
        //print "before decoding $val\n";
        do {
            $oldval = $val;
            $val = html_entity_decode($val, ENT_QUOTES | ENT_HTML5);    // Decode '&colon;', '&apos;', '&Tab;', '&NewLine', ...
            // Sometimes we have entities without the ; at end so html_entity_decode does not work but entities is still interpreted by browser.
            $val = preg_replace_callback(
                '/&#(x?[0-9][0-9a-f]+;?)/i',
                /**
                 * @param string[] $m
                 * @return string
                 */
                static function ($m) {
                    // Decode '&#110;', ...
                    return Filters::realCharForNumericEntities($m);
                },
                $val
            );

            // We clean html comments because some hacks try to obfuscate evil strings by inserting HTML comments. Example: on<!-- -->error=alert(1)
            $val = preg_replace('/<!--[^>]*-->/', '', $val);
            $val = preg_replace('/[\r\n\t]/', '', $val);
        } while ($oldval != $val);
        //print "type = ".$type." after decoding: ".$val."\n";

        $inj = 0;

        // We check string because some hacks try to obfuscate evil strings by inserting non printable chars. Example: 'java(ascci09)scr(ascii00)ipt' is processed like 'javascript' (whatever is place of evil ascii char)
        // We should use dol_string_nounprintableascii but function is not yet loaded/available
        // Example of valid UTF8 chars:
        // utf8=utf8mb3:    '\x09', '\x0A', '\x0D', '\x7E'
        // utf8=utf8mb3:    '\xE0\xA0\x80'
        // utf8mb4:         '\xF0\x9D\x84\x9E'   (but this may be refused by the database insert if pagecode is utf8=utf8mb3)
        $newval = preg_replace('/[\x00-\x08\x0B-\x0C\x0E-\x1F\x7F]/u', '', $val); // /u operator makes UTF8 valid characters being ignored so are not included into the replace

        // Note that $newval may also be completely empty '' when non valid UTF8 are found.
        if ($newval != $val) {
            // If $val has changed after removing non valid UTF8 chars, it means we have an evil string.
            $inj += 1;
        }
        //print 'inj='.$inj.'-type='.$type.'-val='.$val.'-newval='.$newval."\n";

        // For SQL Injection (only GET are used to scan for such injection strings)
        if ($type == 1 || $type == 3) {
            // Note the \s+ is replaced into \s* because some spaces may have been modified in previous loop
            $inj += preg_match('/delete\s*from/i', $val);
            $inj += preg_match('/create\s*table/i', $val);
            $inj += preg_match('/insert\s*into/i', $val);
            $inj += preg_match('/select\s*from/i', $val);
            $inj += preg_match('/into\s*(outfile|dumpfile)/i', $val);
            $inj += preg_match('/user\s*\(/i', $val); // avoid to use function user() or mysql_user() that return current database login
            $inj += preg_match('/information_schema/i', $val); // avoid to use request that read information_schema database
            $inj += preg_match('/<svg/i', $val); // <svg can be allowed in POST
            $inj += preg_match('/update[^&=\w].*set.+=/i', $val);   // the [^&=\w] test is to avoid error when request is like action=update&...set... or &updatemodule=...set...
            $inj += preg_match('/union.+select/i', $val);
        }
        if ($type == 3) {
            // Note the \s+ is replaced into \s* because some spaces may have been modified in previous loop
            $inj += preg_match('/select|update|delete|truncate|replace|group\s*by|concat|count|from|union/i', $val);
        }
        if ($type != 2) {   // Not common key strings, so we can check them both on GET and POST
            $inj += preg_match('/updatexml\(/i', $val);
            $inj += preg_match('/(\.\.%2f)+/i', $val);
            $inj += preg_match('/\s@@/', $val);
        }
        // For XSS Injection done by closing textarea to execute content into a textarea field
        $inj += preg_match('/<\/textarea/i', $val);
        // For XSS Injection done by adding javascript with script
        // This is all cases a browser consider text is javascript:
        // When it found '<script', 'javascript:', '<style', 'onload\s=' on body tag, '="&' on a tag size with old browsers
        // All examples on page: http://ha.ckers.org/xss.html#XSScalc
        // More on https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_Filter_Evasion_Cheat_Sheet
        $inj += preg_match('/<audio/i', $val);
        $inj += preg_match('/<embed/i', $val);
        $inj += preg_match('/<iframe/i', $val);
        $inj += preg_match('/<object/i', $val);
        $inj += preg_match('/<script/i', $val);
        $inj += preg_match('/Set\.constructor/i', $val); // ECMA script 6
        if (!defined('NOSTYLECHECK')) {
            $inj += preg_match('/<style/i', $val);
        }
        $inj += preg_match('/base\s+href/si', $val);
        $inj += preg_match('/=data:/si', $val);
        // List of dom events is on https://www.w3schools.com/jsref/dom_obj_event.asp and https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Events
        $inj += preg_match('/on(mouse|drag|key|load|touch|pointer|select|transition)[a-z]*\s*=/i', $val); // onmousexxx can be set on img or any html tag like <img title='...' onmouseover=alert(1)>
        $inj += preg_match('/on(abort|after|animation|auxclick|before|blur|cancel|canplay|canplaythrough|change|click|close|contextmenu|cuechange|copy|cut)[a-z]*\s*=/i', $val);
        $inj += preg_match('/on(dblclick|drop|durationchange|emptied|end|ended|error|focus|focusin|focusout|formdata|gotpointercapture|hashchange|input|invalid)[a-z]*\s*=/i', $val);
        $inj += preg_match('/on(lostpointercapture|offline|online|pagehide|pageshow)[a-z]*\s*=/i', $val);
        $inj += preg_match('/on(paste|pause|play|playing|progress|ratechange|reset|resize|scroll|search|seeked|seeking|show|stalled|start|submit|suspend)[a-z]*\s*=/i', $val);
        $inj += preg_match('/on(timeupdate|toggle|unload|volumechange|waiting|wheel)[a-z]*\s*=/i', $val);
        // More not into the previous list

        $inj += preg_match('/on(repeat|begin|finish|beforeinput)[a-z]*\s*=/i', $val);

        // We refuse html into html because some hacks try to obfuscate evil strings by inserting HTML into HTML. Example: <img on<a>error=alert(1) to bypass test on onerror
        $tmpval = preg_replace('/<[^<]+>/', '', $val);
        // List of dom events is on https://www.w3schools.com/jsref/dom_obj_event.asp and https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Events
        $inj += preg_match('/on(mouse|drag|key|load|touch|pointer|select|transition)[a-z]*\s*=/i', $tmpval); // onmousexxx can be set on img or any html tag like <img title='...' onmouseover=alert(1)>
        $inj += preg_match('/on(abort|after|animation|auxclick|before|blur|cancel|canplay|canplaythrough|change|click|close|contextmenu|cuechange|copy|cut)[a-z]*\s*=/i', $tmpval);
        $inj += preg_match('/on(dblclick|drop|durationchange|emptied|end|ended|error|focus|focusin|focusout|formdata|gotpointercapture|hashchange|input|invalid)[a-z]*\s*=/i', $tmpval);
        $inj += preg_match('/on(lostpointercapture|offline|online|pagehide|pageshow)[a-z]*\s*=/i', $tmpval);
        $inj += preg_match('/on(paste|pause|play|playing|progress|ratechange|reset|resize|scroll|search|seeked|seeking|show|stalled|start|submit|suspend)[a-z]*\s*=/i', $tmpval);
        $inj += preg_match('/on(timeupdate|toggle|unload|volumechange|waiting|wheel)[a-z]*\s*=/i', $tmpval);
        // More not into the previous list
        $inj += preg_match('/on(repeat|begin|finish|beforeinput)[a-z]*\s*=/i', $tmpval);

        //$inj += preg_match('/on[A-Z][a-z]+\*=/', $val);   // To lock event handlers onAbort(), ...
        $inj += preg_match('/&#58;|&#0000058|&#x3A/i', $val); // refused string ':' encoded (no reason to have it encoded) to lock 'javascript:...'
        $inj += preg_match('/j\s*a\s*v\s*a\s*s\s*c\s*r\s*i\s*p\s*t\s*:/i', $val);
        $inj += preg_match('/vbscript\s*:/i', $val);
        // For XSS Injection done by adding javascript closing html tags like with onmousemove, etc... (closing a src or href tag with not cleaned param)
        if ($type == 1 || $type == 3) {
            $val = str_replace('enclosure="', 'enclosure=X', $val); // We accept enclosure=" for the export/import module
            $inj += preg_match('/"/i', $val); // We refused " in GET parameters value.
        }
        if ($type == 2) {
            $inj += preg_match('/[:;"\'<>\?\(\){}\$%]/', $val); // PHP_SELF is a file system (or url path without parameters). It can contains spaces.
        }

        return $inj;
    }

    /**
     * Return the real char for a numeric entities.
     * WARNING: This function is required by testSqlAndScriptInject() and the GETPOST 'restricthtml'. Regex calling must be similar.
     *
     * @param array<int,string> $matches Array with a decimal numeric entity into key 0, value without the &# into the key 1
     * @return  string                                  New value
     */
    public static function realCharForNumericEntities($matches)
    {
        $newstringnumentity = preg_replace('/;$/', '', $matches[1]);
        //print  ' $newstringnumentity='.$newstringnumentity;

        if (preg_match('/^x/i', $newstringnumentity)) {     // if numeric is hexadecimal
            $newstringnumentity = hexdec(preg_replace('/^x/i', '', $newstringnumentity));
        } else {
            $newstringnumentity = (int)$newstringnumentity;
        }

        // The numeric values we don't want as entities because they encode ascii char, and why using html entities on ascii except for haking ?
        if (($newstringnumentity >= 65 && $newstringnumentity <= 90) || ($newstringnumentity >= 97 && $newstringnumentity <= 122)) {
            return chr((int)$newstringnumentity);
        }

        // The numeric values we want in UTF8 instead of entities because it is emoji
        $arrayofemojis = static::getEmojis();
        foreach ($arrayofemojis as $valarray) {
            if ($newstringnumentity >= hexdec($valarray[0]) && $newstringnumentity <= hexdec($valarray[1])) {
                // This is a known emoji
                return html_entity_decode($matches[0], ENT_COMPAT | ENT_HTML5, 'UTF-8');
            }
        }

        return '&#' . $matches[1]; // Value will be unchanged because regex was /&#(  )/
    }
}


1			<?php
2
3			/* Copyright (C) 2024 Rafael San José <[email protected]>
4			*
5			* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6			* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
7			* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
8			* (at your option) any later version.
9			*
10			* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
11			* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
12			* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
13			* GNU General Public License for more details.
14			*
15			* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
16			* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
17			*/
18
19			namespace Dolibarr\Lib;
20
21			use Exception;
22
23			abstract class Filters
24			{
25			/**
26			* Remove EMoji from email content
27			*
28			* @param string $text String to sanitize
29			* @param int $allowedemoji Mode to allow emoji
30			* @return string Sanitized string
31			*/
32			public static function removeEmoji($text, $allowedemoji = 1)
33			{
34			// $allowedemoji can be
35			// 0=no emoji, 1=exclude the main known emojis (default), 2=keep only the main known (not implemented), 3=accept all
36			// Note that to accept emoji in database, you must use utf8mb4, utf8mb3 is not enough.
37
38			if ($allowedemoji == 0) {
39			// For a large removal:
40			$text = preg_replace('/[\x{2600}-\x{FFFF}]/u', '', $text);
41			$text = preg_replace('/[\x{10000}-\x{10FFFF}]/u', '', $text);
42			}
43
44			// Delete emoji chars with a regex
45			// See https://www.unicode.org/emoji/charts/full-emoji-list.html
46			if ($allowedemoji == 1) {
47			$arrayofcommonemoji = static::getEmojis();
48
49			foreach ($arrayofcommonemoji as $key => $valarray) {
50			$text = preg_replace('/[\x{' . $valarray[0] . '}-\x{' . $valarray[1] . '}]/u', '', $text);
51			}
52			}
53
54			if ($allowedemoji == 2) {
55			// TODO Not yet implemented
56			}
57
58			return $text;
59			}
60
61			/**
62			* Return array of Emojis for miscellaneous use.
63			*
64			* @return array<string,array<string>> Array of Emojis in hexadecimal
65			*/
66			private static function getEmojis()
67			{
68			$arrayofcommonemoji = array(
69			'misc' => array('2600', '26FF'), // Miscellaneous Symbols
70			'ding' => array('2700', '27BF'), // Dingbats
71			'????' => array('9989', '9989'), // Variation Selectors
72			'vars' => array('FE00', 'FE0F'), // Variation Selectors
73			'pict' => array('1F300', '1F5FF'), // Miscellaneous Symbols and Pictographs
74			'emot' => array('1F600', '1F64F'), // Emoticons
75			'tran' => array('1F680', '1F6FF'), // Transport and Map Symbols
76			'flag' => array('1F1E0', '1F1FF'), // Flags (note: may be 1F1E6 instead of 1F1E0)
77			'supp' => array('1F900', '1F9FF'), // Supplemental Symbols and Pictographs
78			);
79
80			return $arrayofcommonemoji;
81			}
82
83			/**
84			* Return true if security check on parameters are OK, false otherwise.
85			*
86			* @param string\|array<string,string> $var Variable name
87			* @param int<0,2> $type 1=GET, 0=POST, 2=PHP_SELF
88			* @param int<0,1> $stopcode 0=No stop code, 1=Stop code (default) if injection found
89			* @return boolean True if there is no injection.
90			*/
91			public static function analyseVarsForSqlAndScriptsInjection(&$var, $type, $stopcode = 1)
92			{
93			if (!is_array($var)) {
94			return (static::testSqlAndScriptInject($var, $type) <= 0);
95			}
96
97			foreach ($var as $key => $value) { // Warning, $key may also be used for attacks
98			// Exclude check for some variable keys
99			if ($type === 0 && defined('NOSCANPOSTFORINJECTION') && is_array(constant('NOSCANPOSTFORINJECTION')) && in_array($key, constant('NOSCANPOSTFORINJECTION'))) {
100			continue;
101			}
102
103			if (static::analyseVarsForSqlAndScriptsInjection($key, $type, $stopcode) && static::analyseVarsForSqlAndScriptsInjection($value, $type, $stopcode)) {
104			//$var[$key] = $value; // This is useless
105			} else {
106			http_response_code(403);
107
108			// Get remote IP: PS: We do not use getRemoteIP(), function is not yet loaded and we need a value that can't be spoofed
109			$ip = (empty($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']) ? 'unknown' : $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']);
110
111			if ($stopcode) {
112			$errormessage = 'Access refused to ' . htmlentities($ip, ENT_COMPAT, 'UTF-8') . ' by SQL or Script injection protection in main.inc.php:analyseVarsForSqlAndScriptsInjection type=' . htmlentities((string)$type, ENT_COMPAT, 'UTF-8');
113			//$errormessage .= ' paramkey='.htmlentities($key, ENT_COMPAT, 'UTF-8'); // Disabled to avoid text injection
114
115			$errormessage2 = 'page=' . htmlentities((empty($_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"]) ? '' : $_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"]), ENT_COMPAT, 'UTF-8');
116			$errormessage2 .= ' paramtype=' . htmlentities((string)$type, ENT_COMPAT, 'UTF-8');
117			$errormessage2 .= ' paramkey=' . htmlentities($key, ENT_COMPAT, 'UTF-8');
118			$errormessage2 .= ' paramvalue=' . htmlentities($value, ENT_COMPAT, 'UTF-8');
119
120			print $errormessage;
121			print "<br>\n";
122			print 'Try to go back, fix data of your form and resubmit it. You can contact also your technical support.';
123
124			print "\n" . '<!--' . "\n";
125			print $errormessage2;
126			print "\n" . '-->';
127
128			// Add entry into the PHP server error log
129			if (function_exists('error_log')) {
130			error_log($errormessage . ' ' . substr($errormessage2, 2000));
131			}
132
133			// Note: No addition into security audit table is done because we don't want to execute code in such a case.
134			// Detection of too many such requests can be done with a fail2ban rule on 403 error code or into the PHP server error log.
135
136
137			if (class_exists('PHPUnit\Framework\TestSuite')) {
138			$message = $errormessage . ' ' . substr($errormessage2, 2000);
139			throw new Exception("Security injection exception: $message");
140			}
141			exit;
			0 ignored issues – show Best Practice introduced 2024-02-22 09:15 UTC by Report Bug Copy Issue Report Using `exit` here is not recommended. In general, usage of exit should be done with care and only when running in a scripting context like a CLI script. Loading history...
142			} else {
143			return false;
144			}
145			}
146			}
147			return true;
148			}
149
150			/**
151			* Security: WAF layer for SQL Injection and XSS Injection (scripts) protection (Filters on GET, POST, PHP_SELF).
152			* Warning: Such a protection can't be enough. It is not reliable as it will always be possible to bypass this. Good protection can
153			* only be guaranteed by escaping data during output.
154			*
155			* @param string $val Brute value found into $_GET, $_POST or PHP_SELF
156			* @param string $type 0=POST, 1=GET, 2=PHP_SELF, 3=GET without sql reserved keywords (the less tolerant test)
157			* @return int >0 if there is an injection, 0 if none
158			*/
159			public static function testSqlAndScriptInject($val, $type)
160			{
161			// Decode string first because a lot of things are obfuscated by encoding or multiple encoding.
162			// So <svg onload='console.log("123")' become <svg onload='console.log("123")'
163			// So "&colon;'" become ":'" (due to ENT_HTML5)
164			// So "&Tab;&NewLine;" become ""
165			// So "()" become "()"
166
167			// Loop to decode until no more things to decode.
168			//print "before decoding $val\n";
169			do {
170			$oldval = $val;
171			$val = html_entity_decode($val, ENT_QUOTES \| ENT_HTML5); // Decode '&colon;', ''', '&Tab;', '&NewLine', ...
172			// Sometimes we have entities without the ; at end so html_entity_decode does not work but entities is still interpreted by browser.
173			$val = preg_replace_callback(
174			'/&#(x?[0-9][0-9a-f]+;?)/i',
175			/**
176			* @param string[] $m
177			* @return string
178			*/
179			static function ($m) {
180			// Decode 'n', ...
181			return Filters::realCharForNumericEntities($m);
182			},
183			$val
184			);
185
186			// We clean html comments because some hacks try to obfuscate evil strings by inserting HTML comments. Example: on<!-- -->error=alert(1)
187			$val = preg_replace('/<!--[^>]*-->/', '', $val);
188			$val = preg_replace('/[\r\n\t]/', '', $val);
189			} while ($oldval != $val);
190			//print "type = ".$type." after decoding: ".$val."\n";
191
192			$inj = 0;
193
194			// We check string because some hacks try to obfuscate evil strings by inserting non printable chars. Example: 'java(ascci09)scr(ascii00)ipt' is processed like 'javascript' (whatever is place of evil ascii char)
195			// We should use dol_string_nounprintableascii but function is not yet loaded/available
196			// Example of valid UTF8 chars:
197			// utf8=utf8mb3: '\x09', '\x0A', '\x0D', '\x7E'
198			// utf8=utf8mb3: '\xE0\xA0\x80'
199			// utf8mb4: '\xF0\x9D\x84\x9E' (but this may be refused by the database insert if pagecode is utf8=utf8mb3)
200			$newval = preg_replace('/[\x00-\x08\x0B-\x0C\x0E-\x1F\x7F]/u', '', $val); // /u operator makes UTF8 valid characters being ignored so are not included into the replace
201
202			// Note that $newval may also be completely empty '' when non valid UTF8 are found.
203			if ($newval != $val) {
204			// If $val has changed after removing non valid UTF8 chars, it means we have an evil string.
205			$inj += 1;
206			}
207			//print 'inj='.$inj.'-type='.$type.'-val='.$val.'-newval='.$newval."\n";
208
209			// For SQL Injection (only GET are used to scan for such injection strings)
210			if ($type == 1 \|\| $type == 3) {
211			// Note the \s+ is replaced into \s* because some spaces may have been modified in previous loop
212			$inj += preg_match('/delete\s*from/i', $val);
213			$inj += preg_match('/create\s*table/i', $val);
214			$inj += preg_match('/insert\s*into/i', $val);
215			$inj += preg_match('/select\s*from/i', $val);
216			$inj += preg_match('/into\s*(outfile\|dumpfile)/i', $val);
217			$inj += preg_match('/user\s*\(/i', $val); // avoid to use function user() or mysql_user() that return current database login
218			$inj += preg_match('/information_schema/i', $val); // avoid to use request that read information_schema database
219			$inj += preg_match('/<svg/i', $val); // <svg can be allowed in POST
220			$inj += preg_match('/update[^&=\w].*set.+=/i', $val); // the [^&=\w] test is to avoid error when request is like action=update&...set... or &updatemodule=...set...
221			$inj += preg_match('/union.+select/i', $val);
222			}
223			if ($type == 3) {
224			// Note the \s+ is replaced into \s* because some spaces may have been modified in previous loop
225			$inj += preg_match('/select\|update\|delete\|truncate\|replace\|group\s*by\|concat\|count\|from\|union/i', $val);
226			}
227			if ($type != 2) { // Not common key strings, so we can check them both on GET and POST
228			$inj += preg_match('/updatexml\(/i', $val);
229			$inj += preg_match('/(\.\.%2f)+/i', $val);
230			$inj += preg_match('/\s@@/', $val);
231			}
232			// For XSS Injection done by closing textarea to execute content into a textarea field
233			$inj += preg_match('/<\/textarea/i', $val);
234			// For XSS Injection done by adding javascript with script
235			// This is all cases a browser consider text is javascript:
236			// When it found '<script', 'javascript:', '<style', 'onload\s=' on body tag, '="&' on a tag size with old browsers
237			// All examples on page: http://ha.ckers.org/xss.html#XSScalc
238			// More on https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_Filter_Evasion_Cheat_Sheet
239			$inj += preg_match('/<audio/i', $val);
240			$inj += preg_match('/<embed/i', $val);
241			$inj += preg_match('/<iframe/i', $val);
242			$inj += preg_match('/<object/i', $val);
243			$inj += preg_match('/<script/i', $val);
244			$inj += preg_match('/Set\.constructor/i', $val); // ECMA script 6
245			if (!defined('NOSTYLECHECK')) {
246			$inj += preg_match('/<style/i', $val);
247			}
248			$inj += preg_match('/base\s+href/si', $val);
249			$inj += preg_match('/=data:/si', $val);
250			// List of dom events is on https://www.w3schools.com/jsref/dom_obj_event.asp and https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Events
251			$inj += preg_match('/on(mouse\|drag\|key\|load\|touch\|pointer\|select\|transition)[a-z]\s=/i', $val); // onmousexxx can be set on img or any html tag like <img title='...' onmouseover=alert(1)>
252			$inj += preg_match('/on(abort\|after\|animation\|auxclick\|before\|blur\|cancel\|canplay\|canplaythrough\|change\|click\|close\|contextmenu\|cuechange\|copy\|cut)[a-z]\s=/i', $val);
253			$inj += preg_match('/on(dblclick\|drop\|durationchange\|emptied\|end\|ended\|error\|focus\|focusin\|focusout\|formdata\|gotpointercapture\|hashchange\|input\|invalid)[a-z]\s=/i', $val);
254			$inj += preg_match('/on(lostpointercapture\|offline\|online\|pagehide\|pageshow)[a-z]\s=/i', $val);
255			$inj += preg_match('/on(paste\|pause\|play\|playing\|progress\|ratechange\|reset\|resize\|scroll\|search\|seeked\|seeking\|show\|stalled\|start\|submit\|suspend)[a-z]\s=/i', $val);
256			$inj += preg_match('/on(timeupdate\|toggle\|unload\|volumechange\|waiting\|wheel)[a-z]\s=/i', $val);
257			// More not into the previous list
258
259			$inj += preg_match('/on(repeat\|begin\|finish\|beforeinput)[a-z]\s=/i', $val);
260
261			// We refuse html into html because some hacks try to obfuscate evil strings by inserting HTML into HTML. Example: <img on<a>error=alert(1) to bypass test on onerror
262			$tmpval = preg_replace('/<[^<]+>/', '', $val);
263			// List of dom events is on https://www.w3schools.com/jsref/dom_obj_event.asp and https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Events
264			$inj += preg_match('/on(mouse\|drag\|key\|load\|touch\|pointer\|select\|transition)[a-z]\s=/i', $tmpval); // onmousexxx can be set on img or any html tag like <img title='...' onmouseover=alert(1)>
265			$inj += preg_match('/on(abort\|after\|animation\|auxclick\|before\|blur\|cancel\|canplay\|canplaythrough\|change\|click\|close\|contextmenu\|cuechange\|copy\|cut)[a-z]\s=/i', $tmpval);
266			$inj += preg_match('/on(dblclick\|drop\|durationchange\|emptied\|end\|ended\|error\|focus\|focusin\|focusout\|formdata\|gotpointercapture\|hashchange\|input\|invalid)[a-z]\s=/i', $tmpval);
267			$inj += preg_match('/on(lostpointercapture\|offline\|online\|pagehide\|pageshow)[a-z]\s=/i', $tmpval);
268			$inj += preg_match('/on(paste\|pause\|play\|playing\|progress\|ratechange\|reset\|resize\|scroll\|search\|seeked\|seeking\|show\|stalled\|start\|submit\|suspend)[a-z]\s=/i', $tmpval);
269			$inj += preg_match('/on(timeupdate\|toggle\|unload\|volumechange\|waiting\|wheel)[a-z]\s=/i', $tmpval);
270			// More not into the previous list
271			$inj += preg_match('/on(repeat\|begin\|finish\|beforeinput)[a-z]\s=/i', $tmpval);
272
273			//$inj += preg_match('/on[A-Z][a-z]+\*=/', $val); // To lock event handlers onAbort(), ...
274			$inj += preg_match('/:\|&#0000058\|&#x3A/i', $val); // refused string ':' encoded (no reason to have it encoded) to lock 'javascript:...'
275			$inj += preg_match('/j\sa\sv\sa\ss\sc\sr\si\sp\st\s:/i', $val);
276			$inj += preg_match('/vbscript\s*:/i', $val);
277			// For XSS Injection done by adding javascript closing html tags like with onmousemove, etc... (closing a src or href tag with not cleaned param)
278			if ($type == 1 \|\| $type == 3) {
279			$val = str_replace('enclosure="', 'enclosure=X', $val); // We accept enclosure=" for the export/import module
280			$inj += preg_match('/"/i', $val); // We refused " in GET parameters value.
281			}
282			if ($type == 2) {
283			$inj += preg_match('/[:;"\'<>\?\(\){}\$%]/', $val); // PHP_SELF is a file system (or url path without parameters). It can contains spaces.
284			}
285
286			return $inj;
287			}
288
289			/**
290			* Return the real char for a numeric entities.
291			* WARNING: This function is required by testSqlAndScriptInject() and the GETPOST 'restricthtml'. Regex calling must be similar.
292			*
293			* @param array<int,string> $matches Array with a decimal numeric entity into key 0, value without the &# into the key 1
294			* @return string New value
295			*/
296			public static function realCharForNumericEntities($matches)
297			{
298			$newstringnumentity = preg_replace('/;$/', '', $matches[1]);
299			//print ' $newstringnumentity='.$newstringnumentity;
300
301			if (preg_match('/^x/i', $newstringnumentity)) { // if numeric is hexadecimal
302			$newstringnumentity = hexdec(preg_replace('/^x/i', '', $newstringnumentity));
303			} else {
304			$newstringnumentity = (int)$newstringnumentity;
305			}
306
307			// The numeric values we don't want as entities because they encode ascii char, and why using html entities on ascii except for haking ?
308			if (($newstringnumentity >= 65 && $newstringnumentity <= 90) \|\| ($newstringnumentity >= 97 && $newstringnumentity <= 122)) {
309			return chr((int)$newstringnumentity);
310			}
311
312			// The numeric values we want in UTF8 instead of entities because it is emoji
313			$arrayofemojis = static::getEmojis();
314			foreach ($arrayofemojis as $valarray) {
315			if ($newstringnumentity >= hexdec($valarray[0]) && $newstringnumentity <= hexdec($valarray[1])) {
316			// This is a known emoji
317			return html_entity_decode($matches[0], ENT_COMPAT \| ENT_HTML5, 'UTF-8');
318			}
319			}
320
321			return '&#' . $matches[1]; // Value will be unchanged because regex was /&#( )/
322			}
323			}
324

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